efficiency improvement (Dosi and Easter, 2003) . In addition, water privatisation was perceived as a means to end government subsidisation by 'depoliticising' water pricing; public water utilities often priced water and sanitation services at below cost-recovery level, creating enormous fi nancial burdens for governments in developing countries. 
Introduction
The 1990s saw an unprecedented wave of water privatisation around the world. Public water utilities' failure to expand service coverage and improve service quality prompted municipalities in many developing countries to turn to the private sector for investment capital, technical expertise and was highly favourable to water privatisation as pro-market politicians rose to leadership positions in many countries and international fi nancial institutions were actively promoting market-oriented reforms in the developing world through loans and technical assistance programmes (Hall et al., 2005) . By the end of 2000, at least 93 countries had experimented with water privatisation in one form or another (Brubaker, 2001) .
The 'exuberant enthusiasm' for the water privatisation, however, was soon subdued by harsh realities marked by renegotiation, termination and cancellation of privatisation contracts and projects. A World Bank database on infrastructure revealed that, by 2002, 75 per cent of contracts for water privatisation in Latin America and the Caribbean had experienced either renegotiation or cancellation (Gómez-Ibáñez et al., 2004) . In Asia, the rate of water privatisation has slowed considerably since the Asian fi nancial crisis, as a number of high-profi le water privatisation projects have been abandoned or cancelled due to disputes over water tariff increases (Hall et al., 2004) .
Some critics have argued that water privatisation is ill-fated because the public benefits of water services are inherently incompatible with the profi t motive of the private sector (Estache et al., 2001; Birdsall and Nellis, 2002; Smith and Hanson, 2003) . Others have held that water privatisation compromises access to water as a basic human right and that it harms the welfare of the poor (Gleick et al., 2002; Scanlon et al., 2004) .
Although arguments against water privatisation have gained currency in recent years, the urgency of the water crises that led to privatisations during the 1990s remains unchanged to the present day: more than 1.1 billion people world-wide lack safe drinking water and 2.4 billion lack adequate sanitation (Kessides, 2004) . The situation is especially acute for many rapidly growing small cities in developing countries: more than half of the residents in these cities do not have water connections (Hewett and Montgomery, 2001) . Inadequate urban water supply systems place a greater fi nancial burden on the urban poor, as a disproportionately high percentage of poorer households lack access to piped water (Johnstone et al., 2001; Marvin and Laurie, 1999) . Studies have shown that unit costs for water from vendors (who often supply to the urban poor) can be as much as 10 times higher than for water from piped connections (Crane, 1994; Chogull and Chogull, 1996) .
The importance of access to safe drinking water to poverty reduction is highlighted by the stated intention of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) to halve the number of people without safe water access by 2015. Enormous fi nancial resources are needed to reach this ambitious goal; estimates from the World Bank early in the new century indicated that developing countries would need US$60 billion for the water sector over the next 10 years (Haarmeyer and Coy, 2002) . It is clearly unrealistic to expect governments in developing countries to fi nance this development entirely on their own. Private-sector participation will continue to be among the few options available to municipalities in many developing countries and especially to the increasing number of fast-growing small and medium-sized cities.
Meanwhile, despite the many criticisms levelled at water privatisation, no empirical evidence has emerged to suggest that funding problems are so inherent in the water supply sector as to pose insurmountable barriers to privatisation. In fact, one recent study (Galiani et al., 2005) has shown that water privatisation reduced child mortality by 5-7 per cent in Argentina, with the largest gains in reduction experienced by the poorest population. Although some research has shown that effi ciency was not signifi cantly different in private and state-run water operations (Estache and Rossi, 2002; Kirkpatrick et al., 2004) , no empirical study has confi rmed claims that private water companies are necessarily less efficient than their public counterparts or that water privatisation hurts the urban poor. Given the importance of private-sector participation to the success of global efforts to alleviate inadequate and unsafe water supplies, it is of paramount importance to understand where, when and how water privatisation could be successfully implemented.
The voluminous literature on water privatisation offers little information about the impact of privatised water utilities' management practices on how privatisation has fared in developing countries. Studies of previous water privatisation cases have typically focused on external factors such as political support, institutional structure, design of contract, transparency of bidding process, public perception and impacts of unforeseeable events (Johnstone et al., 2001; Shirley and Menard, 2002) . These factors, undoubtedly critical determinants in the success or failure of water privatisation, are nevertheless external conditions in the sense that they are outside the control of privatised water utilities. We argue here that privatisation involves transformation in ownership structure and organisational culture within water utilities and that how the transformation is managed at the company level has a direct bearing on the outcome of privatisation.
One plausible explanation for the lack of scholarly work on the impacts of internal factors on water privatisation is that it is methodologically challenging to assess what these internal factors are and how they function. First, it is fairly diffi cult to disentangle the effects of internal factors from those of external factors, as they are often intermixed and shaped by particular conditions, such that case studies detailing water privatisation in a specifi c locality cannot usefully generate defi nite conclusions about the effects of internal factors. Secondly, external factors are often more visible and thus more tractable analytically than internal factors, because it is easier to obtain information on external factors than on internal factors, which may not be readily available in the public domain. Thirdly, statistical tools such as regression analysis may offer only limited insights on internal factors because localised peculiarities can be hard to quantify and to compare meaningfully.
The recent history of water privatisation in Metro Manila presents a unique opportunity as a natural experiment to analyse and compare the effects of internal factors on the success of privatisation efforts in an urban context. When Manila's Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) was privatised in 1997, metropolitan Manila was divided into two zones and concession contracts were accordingly awarded to two companies, Maynilad (West Zone) and Manila Water (East Zone). Because the two concessionaires faced the same external factorsfor example, political support, institutional structure, contract design, transparency of bidding process and locally shared unforeseen events-the analyst can concentrate on differences in internal factors and study the effects of these differences on the success and failure of water privatisation.
The discussion continues by developing theoretical linkages between water privatisation and three internal factors: corporate governance, financial management and operations management. An overview of the evolution of water privatisation in Metro Manila sets the stage for analysis and comparison of the performance of the two concessionaires after privatisation, in terms of how differences in internal factors have contributed to the different paths that they took and the outcomes they experienced. The fi nal discussion summarises important results of the analysis and addresses their implications for water privatisation policy and for innovation in public water utilities.
Internal Factors and Water Privatisation: Theoretical Linkages
Because privatisation of public services such as water utilities entails complex changes in economic, social and even political structures, the process is unquestionably shaped by various external factors such as political environment and regulatory structures. Yet privatisation also involves transformations in ownership structure, organisational culture and operations management; how such transformations are managed, at the company level, has a direct bearing on the outcome of privatisation. In the present case, some theoretical linkages can be made between internal factors (such as corporate governance, financial management and operations management) and the success of water privatisation.
Corporate Governance
Corporate governance refers to the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in a corporation (the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders) and the rules and procedures that have been adopted for making decisions on corporate affairs (OECD, 1999) . Three fundamental principles of corporate governance are accountability, transparency and responsibility. Improvements in corporate governance are an important mechanism by which privatisation may enhance performance.
For example, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) often suffer from a principal-agent problem whereby managers cannot be easily held accountable for their actions. Privatised corporate governance offers the prospect of tighter control of employee performance by linking job tenure directly to performance and accountability. Yet experiences in privatisation in recent decades have shown that transfer of ownership cannot guarantee improvement in corporate governance (Dyck, 2001) . Nestor (2005) observes that newly privatised companies with a widely dispersed body of owners may fall prey to managerial opportunism-a problem that can become especially pronounced in developing countries where market mechanisms for corporate control have not become well established. In many transition economies, weak corporate governance has been exploited to loot state resources through the privatisation process itself (Black et al., 2000) .
Some unique features of water privatisation pose particular challenges to corporate governance. First, because water is perceived as an essential good, privatised water companies are often subjected to close scrutiny from the public, who are likely to expect high standards of corporate governance. Aguas Argentinas SA (AASA), the private water company in Buenos Aires, experienced this firsthand: the company's reluctance to employ competitive bidding in selecting contracts and its refusal to share information about its contractors bred public distrust and growing hostility, not only towards AASA itself but also towards the Argentine government and regulatory agency (Bosman, 2005) . Because consumers are such important stakeholders in privatised water utilities, these companies must adopt a broad concept of corporate governance that recognises public satisfaction as a primary goal.
Secondly, the very nature of water supply technology (which involves high fi xed capital costs and increasing rate of return) determines that water utilities are natural monopolies whether in governmental or in private hands. Thus market competition as an external mechanism for effective corporate control is almost non-existent in the water sector and regulatory agencies are the arbiter of last resort. However, regulatory agencies often suffer from information asymmetry and their effectiveness may be further reduced by the general weakness in regulatory capacity found in many developing countries.
Thirdly, because of the substantial fi nancial and human resources needed to operate urban water systems, privatised water utilities are often formed as joint ventures among several partners, typically some combination of domestic and foreign interests. Although a strategic alliance among these different partners is necessitated by political, legal, fi nancial and technical considerations, the potential for confl icts of interest among them cannot be underestimated. Bad corporate governance can quickly lead to internal confl icts that may bring out the worst in all involved (Bamford and Ernst, 2005) .
The fourth challenge confronting privatised water utilities is that water privatisation often involves conglomerates that control many subsidiaries through a complex web of pyramiding and cross-holding.
1 Directors within these groups often sit on each other's governing boards. Resulting effects include little independent scrutiny of individual company management and considerably weakened shareholder discipline (Nestor, 2005) . Controlling shareholders could potentially expropriate the benefi ts of minority shareholders and other stakeholders through related-party transactions that are likely to be detrimental to the operations of the privatised water utilities as well as to the public interest.
Financial Management
A primary consideration for water privatisation in developing countries is the need to attract private investments into the water sector, but these private investments often do not come cheaply. Newly privatised water companies require substantial amounts of capital for settling labour issues as well as for system renovation and expansion, and they must rely heavily on capital markets to finance the deficit. However, because newly privatised companies are not 'known' in fi nancial markets and carry the baggage of past public governance, access to credit is expensive (Ozkaya and Askari, 1999) . In many developing countries where a domestic capital market is not well established, the only accessible sources may be foreign, a very expensive option because of the substantial amount of risk involved.
Uncertainty regarding regulatory actions and consumers' sensitivity to tariff increases further heighten the risks involved in water privatisation projects. Haarmeyer and Mody (1997) describe the evolution of private fi nancing in the water sector as a three-step process. The fi rst step is limited-recourse fi nancing, which is typically expensive because of risks within the sector as well as uncertainties associated with early development stages. The second step is fi nancing through returned earnings, once a stable set of rate-paying customers has been achieved and confi dence in the regulatory process has grown. The third step is bond fi nancing, much cheaper than limited-recourse fi nancing but only available for utilities with a track record of stable revenue sources. Privatised water companies might become fi nancially stressed in the early stages of development, not because they fail to achieve effi ciency gains but because such gains fall short of covering the expensive limited-recourse fi nancing. Prudent fi nancial management from the outset is thus a key to the success of the water privatisation in developing countries.
In preparing bids for water privatisation, potential bidders may suffer from the socalled winner's curse by underestimating the effects of potential risks such as political risk, currency risk and fi nancial risk. This may improve the prospects of winning concessions, but such bids may become unsustainable when unforeseeable setbacks arise. Water privatisation in Buenos Aires, for example, had been seen as a huge success until, in the wake of the convertibility crisis between 2000 and 2002, the privatised utility found itself heavily indebted but unable to attract fresh capital to cover contractual obligations.
Operations Management
Water privatisation involves two crucial activities at which privatised water utilities rarely excel: the transformation of a public utility into a private company and the management of public expectations. Employees in public water utilities, as in other SOEs, are often guaranteed life-long employment and thus are not motivated to improve performance. Developing an effi cient incentive system is an essential part of organisational restructuring in newly privatised firms (Ozkaya and Askari, 1999) . Employees in the public sector are also often slow in responding to customers' demands because there is almost no competition to supply the services they provide. Concessionaires' ability to build an organisational culture that promotes a commercial, customer-driven working environment is essential to the success of the transformation from public to private water company.
Management of public expectations is of critical importance to a privatised water utility's survival. Because water is perceived as essential good, there is often controversy over whether the private sector is fi t to operate the water system. In addition, public water utilities generally keep prices below costs; the expectation usually is that privatisation will not change that. Although this is virtually always an unrealistic notion, how to contend with imperatives for price increases in the face of unrealistic public expectations is a challenging task. A recent World Bank study discovered that most water and sewerage projects that were cancelled had been confronted with confl icts between price increases and difficulties in collecting from consumers (Harris et al., 2003) .
Two useful strategies for dispelling opposition to water privatisation are to build corporate legitimacy and to establish strategic alliances. Although concession agreements may contain mandates that privatised water companies must establish their legitimacy as customer-focused companies commensurate with their private-sector status, such legitimacy could be challenged because of the natural monopoly that characterises water utilities and because of information asymmetry. Privatised water companies can build corporate legitimacy through disclosure to customers and image management (Ogden and Clarke, 2005) . In many developing countries, the most likely allies in support of a privatised water utility would be the urban poor who do not have water connections. They often pay several times more than connected residents while suffering from the worst service quality (Johnstone et al., 2001) . Privatised water companies can signifi cantly strengthen their corporate legitimacy by aligning their interests with those among the poor who strongly demand coverage for underserved communities.
In the following two sections, we show that water privatisation in Manila offers a rare opportunity as a natural experiment to study the effects of these internal factors on water privatisation.
Water Privatisation in Manila
Comprised of 12 cities and 5 municipalities, Metro Manila has 11 million inhabitants, about 13 per cent of the total population of the Philippines, and is densely populated, with about 16 000 persons per square kilometre. Privatisation of water services was first proposed in the mid 1990s when MWSS, the state-owned water utility responsible for providing water and sanitation for Metro Manila, had become unable to expand coverage adequately to a rapidly growing population. By 1996, MWSS was only able to supply an average of 16 hours of water per day to two-thirds of its coverage population. Its effi ciency as measured by non-revenue water (NRW) 2 and number of staff per 1000 connections was the lowest among major Asian cities (see Table 1 ).
The urban poor were hurt the most by MWSS's ineffective and inefficient operations. According to a 1995 household survey, poor households that relied on private water vendors paid prices up to 13 times higher than the rates for MWSS household water connections (David and Inocencio, 1998) . Furthermore, with water and sanitation services priced below costs, MWSS had to rely on periodic government subsidies to service its debts, placing a heavy fi nancial burden to the government.
Water privatisation thus appeared to be an attractive solution to the looming water crisis. The Ramos administration believed that water privatisation could improve operations effi ciency, raise fi nancial resources for water investments and end the need for government subsidies (David, 2001) . In 1995 the Water Crisis Act was enacted, giving the president the authority to privatise MWSS within one year. The government wasted no time in laying the groundwork, which was closely patterned on the example of Buenos Aires. The water tariff was increased by 38 per cent in August 1996 in anticipation of pressures for an increase during the process of privatisation; in the meantime, the MWSS labour force was cut by 30 per cent. Both strategies helped to boost private-sector interest in participating in water privatisation (Dumol, 2000) .
International fi nancial institutions were closely involved in the privatisation process from the very beginning. In 1995, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) provided a technical assistance (TA) grant amounting to US$582 000 as a part of its Umiray-Angat Transbasin Project, to assist MWSS in promoting privatisation activities. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank acted as the lead advisor for the design and the implementation of water privatisation.
A critical feature in the design of water privatisation in Manila was that the service areas in Metro Manila were divided into two zones (see Figure 1) , which according to the bidding rule could not be operated by a single concessionaire. There were three reasons for the split: it gave regulators more leverage in their negotiations with concessionaires; it provided opportunities for benchmark comparisons between the two zones; and, the arrangement served as a safety valve, such that if one concessionaire got into fi nancial trouble, the other concessionaire could take over (Dumol, 2000) .
In January 1997, in what has been known as the world's largest water privatisation deal, competitive bidding was held to privatise MWSS. Four consortia submitted bids for both the East and West Zones. In accordance over the 25-year period to service the existing debts of MWSS and to fi nance the operations of the MWSS Regulatory Offi ce, which had been established to oversee the implementation of concession contracts. The concession contracts also specified tariff adjustment mechanisms. Three grounds were deemed acceptable for rate adjustments: inflation, extraordinary price adjustment (EPA) and rate-rebasing. The concessionaires would be allowed to adjust base rates automatically according to the consumer price index. Tariffs could be adjusted annually to recoup the fi nancial effects of certain events unforeseeable to the concessionaires, such as sharp devaluation and changes in laws and regulations. A rate-rebasing exercise would be conducted every fi ve years so that return on investment, or appropriate discount rate (ADR), would not exceed a fair return. The original intention of rate-rebasing was that the concessionaires would be allowed to reap effi ciency gains during the interval of two consecutive rate-rebasing exercises; rate adjustments every fi ve years would ensure that consumers also shared the benefi ts of the effi ciency improvement. Unfortunately, tariff adjustments through rate-rebasing became a major source of tension and controversy soon after privatisation because both the level of ADR and the validation of various assumptions for computing rates of investment were subject to regulatory discretion.
Another critical feature of water privatisation in Manila was the extremely low bids offered by the two winning consortiaespecially by Manila Water, which proposed a base rate amounting to only one-fourth of MWSS tariffs at the time of bidding (see Table 2 ). In fact, the bid was so low that officials administering the bidding process had to confi rm with Manila Water that it was indeed the water tariff that was meant, and not the discount (Dumol, 2000) . The overall impression among the policy-makers was that the generally low bids reflected both the ineffi ciency in MWSS and the private sector's confi dence. In retrospect, although the low bids ensured an easy sell of the concession agreements to water consumers in Metro Manila, they planted the seeds for public outcry about rate increases in the years following the privatisation process.
Two unforeseen events deeply undermined the fi nancial models used by the two winning consortia in the bidding process, making them grossly inaccurate. The fi rst was that just after the concessions were granted, the Angat Reservoir, from which 98 per cent of Manila's water supply is drawn, had experienced an unprecedented drought; the amount of water available to the two concessionaires decreased by 30 per cent. The second was the Asian fi nancial crisis under which currency devaluation almost doubled MWSS's dollar-denominated debt service burden. The fi nancial obligation for the two concessionaires increased accordingly, as the concession agreements had stipulated that MWSS debt service was to be paid for from concession fees. 4 The fi nancial crisis also made it more expensive for the concessionaires to Not surprisingly, the low tariffs that were to be achieved through water privatisation proved 'too good to be true' (Fabella, 2006) ; tariffs began to rise gradually through 2001 and accelerated after October 2001, when a contract amendment was granted by the Regulatory Offi ce (see Table 3 ). In the public eye and among civil society groups, the government had been perceived as fairly accommodating to the two concessionaires' demands. A foreign currency differential adjustment (FCDA) was granted to allow the concessionaires to recover automatically from the foreign currency losses at an accelerated rate; also, the appropriate discount rate (ADR) was adjusted signifi cantly upwards in the rate-rebasing process held in 2002. In addition to accelerated recovery of foreign currency losses and higher ADR, targets for expansion and NRW were also adjusted downwards in the contract amendment so that the two concessionaires could reduce their capital expenditure requirement in the early years of operation. Manila Water took a completely different path. Although its bids seemed to be unrealistically low at the outset and even more so in light of the unanticipated events that followed, and although it missed some key targets in the early years after privatisation, the company performed well fi nancially. Its NRW was reduced from 58 per cent in 1997 to 35 per cent in 2005. Remarkably, the company had begun to make a profi t by 1999, when water in the East Zone was selling at a huge discount off the pre-privatisation rate, and it has been profi 
Internal Factors and Water Privatisation in Manila: Maynilad vs Manila Water Corporate Governance
A striking feature of corporate governance in the Philippines is the concentration of economic power in an extremely small number of family conglomerates. The largest family conglomerate controls 17 per cent of the nation's total market capitalisation; the largest 10 families control more than 50 per cent (Wu, 2005) . The interlocking nature of corporate control within these conglomerates presents special challenges for discipline in the corporate sector (Saldana, 2001) . Two of the three largest of these family conglomerates, Lopez and Ayala, became involved in the water privatisation in Manila. Lopez controlled Maynilad through Benpres Holdings, a publicly listed holding company, and Ayala controlled Manila Water through the Ayala Corporation, another publicly listed pure holding company. Both conglomerates have used pyramiding and cross-holding to control business interests in real estate, banking, construction, telecommunication and electricity production and distribution.
The involvement of multinational water companies in water privatisation in Manila added another dimension of complexity to corporate governance of the two concessionaires. Strategic alliances with multinational water companies were considered key inducements for Lopez and Ayala to participate, as neither had technical expertise in operating urban water systems. The possibility arose, however, that problems might develop from multinational partnerships, owing to differences in management styles and corporate cultures. A more important consideration was that their interests might not always be aligned, especially likely insofar as the participating companies all had other subsidiaries and affi liates whose interests might in turn be affected by operational decisions made by the two concessionaires.
The concessionaires' responses to these challenges differed markedly. In Maynilad, contracts for services and consultancies went largely to Suez and Benpres, as well as to their subsidiaries or affiliates. For example, a management consultancy contract went to Lyonnaise des Eaux Philippines (LDEP), a subsidiary of Suez; a programme management contract went to Safage Consulting and Montgomery Watson, both affi liates of Suez; service contracts went to First Philippine Balfour Beatty and to Philippine Steel Fabricators, Inc., both subsidiaries of First Philippine Holdings Corporation, which is a subsidiary of Benpres Holdings. The size of such contracts was often substantial. For example, in 2001, when Maynilad decided to stop paying its concession fee because of heavy indebtedness, 11 French consultants were reportedly paid Php 168 million, of which Php 110 million was for consultancy services (Santiago, 2002) .
Because related-party transactions were shielded from competitive bidding, Maynilad incurred exorbitant costs. For example, Maynilad's computers were purchased from IBM France, an affi liate of Suez. Compared with Manila Water, the East Zone concessionaire, Maynilad spent, per employee, 80 per cent more on computers (Diokno-Pascual, 2004) . Table 4 shows comparatively higher operating costs for Maynilad on almost all categories; the exception, utilities cost, is due to higher pumping requirements for Manila Water's service area. It is especially curious that Maynilad's operating costs (see Table 5 ), especially nonpersonnel operating costs, actually increased dramatically while its fi nancial woes were worsening; one would expect to see exactly the opposite in a fi nancially distressed company. And related-party transactions led to more than these high operating expenditures: they aggravated tensions between the two partners (Benpres and Suez) that had plagued the water privatisation initiative from the very beginning. Although a private water company's management determines the quality of its corporate governance practices, the public sector has ample opportunities to infl uence corporate governance practices through the bidding process, regulatory actions and asset ownership. Government officials guiding the bidding process would be wise to pay careful attention to each bidder's corporate governance practices, as these could be an indicator of how that bidder might perform if awarded the contract. Government can also include good corporate governance practices in concession agreements. Mark Dumol, a government official who was extensively involved in the bidding process in Manila, has particularly emphasised the potential of utilising regulatory tools to constrain bad corporate governance practices:
If I can rewrite the privatization rules, I would put in tougher provisions against the shareholder-related companies', especially the foreign partners', making a quick buck from transactions with the local concessionaire company (Landingin, 2003) .
In retrospect, benchmark competition established by having two concessionaires seems to have worked from the perspective of the public. Having two concessionaires operating in the same city and subject to the same political environment not only helped the Regulatory Offi ce to overcome the information asymmetry associated with water privatisation (and with weak regulatory capacity as well), it also offered the concessionaires a yardstick for assessing and containing the potential negative impacts of related-party transactions. Perhaps the most important benefi t was that the information available through benchmark competition helped to dissipate the public's anxiety in dealing with tariff increases.
Financial Management
The fi nancial models used by the two concessionaires for the bidding in early 1997 were prepared at a time when foreign capital was pouring into the Philippines, begging for investment opportunities. The Asian fi nancial crisis abruptly and completely changed the landscape that the two new concessionaires confronted. Easy credit was no longer available and creditors had become extremely meticulous in the due-diligence process. Manila Water made some critical adjustments to its financial management in response to the crisis. First, it focused on domestic lenders for capital expenditure by leveraging on Ayala Corporation's good reputation and successfully settled for smallsize loans from several local banks, starting at a level of about US$20 million in 1998 and gradually increasing in cumulative levels to US$25 million in 1999, US$55 million in 2000 and US$67 million in 2001. Secondly, it slowed down its capital expenditure considerably as compared with the original bids. Although this resulted in Manila Water's failure to achieve some goals in the early years, the slowdown may have been a sensible strategy for protecting the company against substantial fi nancial risk before it could use less expensive means of fi nancing. Thirdly, Manila Water targeted the areas that were most likely to produce fi nancial improvements with a limited amount of capital expenditure, such as innovative approaches in reducing NRW. Manila Water's cautious approach to fi nancial management paid off. It is remarkable that the company was able to make a profi t as early as 1999, when the water in East Zone was still selling at a signifi cant discount compared with the pre-privatisation level. Small but well-targeted capital expenditure right after privatisation allowed the company to solidify its bottom line, enabling it to secure less expensive fi nancing later on. Manila Water's capital expenditure has increased signifi cantly since 2002 (Figure 2) , which should help it to achieve its targeting in the years to come.
The same prudence in fi nancial management is not evident in the case of Maynilad. It focused on immediately securing a huge US$350 million term loan from the Asian Development Bank, European Investment Bank and a syndicate of foreign commercial banks with the participation of COFAGE as political risk insurer, for its capital expenditure projects. This strategy failed as the huge borrowing proved to be very diffi cult to close. The prospective long-term lenders set stringent conditions and only initially agreed to a US$100 million bridge loan.
While this should have allowed the company to make strategic capital investments to improve fi nancial performance, the anticipated opportunities never materialised. Despite substantial capital expenditure, Maynilad was very slow to attend to some critical aspects in improving its fi nancial standing. For example, until 2004 Maynilad did not have a database that could provide area-specifi c estimates of water losses due to theft versus losses due mainly to the bad state of pipes and ineffi cient metering (Esguerra, 2006) . In the meantime, the negotiation for the full-term loan became protracted and the large capital investment without resulting operational effi ciencies led to more accumulated fi nancial losses that eventually bankrupted the company. In March 2003, Maynilad defaulted on its payment of the bridge loan and closure of the term loan has inevitably fallen through.
Operations Management
The two concessionaires jointly inherited a highly centralised organisational structure that retained some of the common characteristics of state-owned utility companies in many developing countries. Most MWSS employees were accustomed to a system that was rule-based and procedure-driven. Consequently, they performed their jobs with little concern for effectiveness and efficiency (Beer and Weldon, 2000a) . To overcome the diffi culties of transforming a public utility into a customer-driven private water company, Manila Water developed strategies centring on a few core objectives: to build a corporate culture focused on honesty, effective performance and customer service; to create a new organisational structure with a clear chain of responsibility through decentralised decision-making; to alter work procedures towards better communication and co-operation; and, to establish a reward system aligning pay with responsibility and results (Beer and Weldon, 2000b) .
A hallmark of Manila Water's approach to these objectives was its effort to instill trust and confi dence in former MWSS employees, which was backed with suffi cient retraining and support. Instead of treating former MWSS employees as a collateral liability in securing the concession contract, Manila Water management viewed them as invaluable and indispensable resources for building a strong new company. Rather than relying on imported talent, Manila Water sent these veteran employees abroad for training and exposure to relevant operational environments (Chotrani, 1999) . Similarly, the company's middle and senior management positions were mostly staffed by former MWSS employees, with only a very few top positions fi lled by representatives seconded from Ayala and its foreign partners. The employee-retention strategy took hold: more than 5 years after privatisation, 95 per cent of Manila Water personnel were former MWSS employees (UTCE and Japan PFI Association, 2004).
Manila Water also adopted several innovative approaches in operations management to target NRW. Although improved corporate governance practices and prudent fi nancial management helped to control operating costs and capital expenses, a key to the company's financial success was its persistent effort towards reducing NRW, which has directly contributed to the revenue increase. Within less than a decade of privatisation, Manila Water reduced NRW signifi cantly, from 58 per cent to 35 per cent of former levels, whereas in the West Zone NRW increased from 64 per cent to 69 per cent (see Figure 3) . This dramatic success was mainly due to two innovations in its operations management: territory management and the Water for the Community programme.
Territory management, a part of Manila Water's management decentralisation initiative, partitioned its service areas in the East Zone into smaller and more manageable clearly defi ned territories. The East Zone was divided into seven business areas, which were in turn sub-divided into a total of 43 operational districts, termed demand monitory zones (DMZs). Each DMZ had approximately 10 000 water connections and was sub-divided into several district metering areas (DMAs), each servicing 500-1000 connections. Each DMA was to be managed by a territory team consisting of a territory business manager, DMA offi cers, meter consumption analysts, site offi cers and service providers. The territory teams would be responsible for customer services, monitoring and control of NRW, and new service development; they also were empowered to make decisions pertaining to their customers' water and wastewater needs, funding and implementation. Because of this clear tiered division of responsibilities, evaluation and compensation of employees and managers could be geared to quality of performance. One improvement resulting from this structure was quicker response to customer demand. Within a few years of its inauguration, the average time to repair leaks was reduced to 4 days in Manila Water's East Zone (compared with 11 days in Maynilad's West Zone) and 97 per cent of customer service complaints were communicated and resolved within 10 days (UTCE and Japan PFI Association, 2004). The territory management system remains in operation today.
The Water for the Community programme (Tubig Para sa Barangay), begun in 1997, focused on extending water supply services to areas containing numerous clusters of lowerincome families. Under this programme, several households (typically two to fi ve) can share one connection and thus split its cost of consumption among them. Where such an arrangement is not feasible, one bulk connection is provided to the whole community (up to 100 or more households) and costs of connections are shared by all. By 2005, more than 500 projects in the East Zone had been completed under the programme, benefi ting approximately 850 000 people in poor communities (Manila Water, 2005) . A unique feature of the initiative is that it brings water only to the edge of a community, next to a main road, where shared meters for a group of households, or the entire community's bulk meter, can be positioned (see Figure 4) . Water is then billed at the volume passing through these meters at the community entry point; it is the responsibility of the community to distribute the water from thence to individual Given that private water companies often encounter political opposition to privatisation in general and to tariff increases in particular, the Water for the Community programme helps Manila Water to build legitimacy. Because the company has been able to provide water services to poor communities that the public water utility had failed to reach, these communities have become political allies in the company's efforts to reduce opposition to water privatisation. The Water for the Community programme also makes business and financial sense for the company. Because Manila Water in effect imposes a zero-NRW rule on projects under the programme, it has actually helped to reduce overall NRW by minimising illegal connections, leaks and water contamination in areas where these problems are the most severe. The programme has also played an important role in attracting support, in the form of low-interest loans or equity investments, from international organisations and foreign government donor organisations concerned with supplying water to the poor. 6 The success of the Water for the Community programme suggests that public benefi ts and private-sector profi t motives may not be inherently incompatible in water privatisation. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this achievement is that projects targeted at water supply for the poor were not specifi ed in the 1997 concession contracts.
The situation was completely different at Maynilad. A large number of employees from Benpres Holdings and its subsidiaries were transferred to Maynilad, most of them with no experience in the water sector; incomers from Suez took up most of the new company's management positions. Former MWSS employees felt they were being treated as second-class citizens in the new company and morale sank. 7 The company did not invest as much as needed to upgrade its employees' capabilities; in its fi rst years of operation, annual expenditure on such training averaged only Php 1500 (about US$30) per employee (UTCE and Japan PFI Association, 2004) . The mentality, mindset and behaviour of former MWSS employees who had remained with the company had scarcely changed from preprivatisation days. 8 Ironically, the idea of territory management had been initiated by employees at Maynilad right after the privatisation, 9 but the company had passed over this option in favour of a system-wide approach to dealing with NRW problems. 10 It did not, however, promptly inaugurate a centralised monitoring plan for pinpointing leaks in the system: the first reliable and consolidated report on leakage was not introduced until 2000 (UTCE and Japan PFI Association, 2004), although billions had already been deployed in capital expenditures for laying new pipes.
Maynilad also created a programme for supplying the poor, a Water for the Community programme (Bayan Tubig). Its expansion model was more 'generous' than Manila Water's: families usually received individual connections, with meters near their houses (see Figure 5 ). This arrangement left the lines exposed, so that unconnected households could tap into the system before the water reached the meter for connected households. In fact, a connected household could even decide to tap its own connection before it reached the meter (UTCE and Japan PFI Association, 2004). Thus it comes as no surprise that NRW continued to rise in these communities as the programme expanded. Maynilad eventually halted Bayan Tubig because of the fi nancial diffi culties the programme had created.
Concluding Remarks
While many of the criticisms levelled at Manila water privatisation have focused on significant rate increases and slower-than-expected service expansion (Buenaventura et al., 2004; Esguerra, 2003) , the performance of privatisation should be assessed in a historical context. It is true that both concessionaires raised their water tariffs substantially in their fi rst years of operation, but the magnitude of increase in part refl ects their extremely low bids: Manila Water's winning bid was only a quarter of the rate before privatisation. Given unforeseen events such as the Asian fi nancial crisis of 1997 and the unprecedented drought that afflicted Angat Reservoir, it is highly plausible that MWSS would have increased its charges to the same level even had it not been privatised, or else the government would have had to assume a substantial fi nancial burden. Although the system expansion still falls short of what is specifi ed in the concession contracts, the two concessions had increased connections by 30 per cent during their fi rst fi ve years of operation-a feat that MWSS would have taken 30 years to achieve on the basis of its historical performance. Impressively, much of that expansion occurred in economically distressed areas, directly benefi ting the urban poor who had formerly relied on more expensive water supply alternatives.
Worker productivity increased signifi cantly after privatisation. Consolidated fi gures for the two concessions show that number of staff per 1000 connections dropped from 9.4 in 1996 to 4.1 in 2003. Both concessionaires managed to resolve overemployment from pre-privatisation levels through early retirement programmes, with little or no social disruption in the corporate setting.
Our investigations show that generalised conclusions about water privatisation in Metro Manila should not be ventured without carefully differentiating between the two concessionaires. There are pluses and minuses in the external factors surrounding water privatisation in Manila, some of which are related to intellectual discourse beyond the scope of this essay; but Manila Water's more successful experience compared with Maynilad's suggests that studies focusing on external factors alone may be too limited. Water privatisation without improvements to management systems for the privatised utilities severely reduces the chance of success, even under favourable external conditions. On the other hand, Metro Manila's experience shows that innovative management practices in privatised water utilities can help to overcome obstacles introduced from the external environment.
Our analysis suggests that decisions regarding internal factors such as corporate governance, fi nancial management and operations management were key factors in the divergent paths taken by the two concessionaires after privatisation. First, while both concessionaires involved family conglomerates (Lopez and Ayala) and multinational companies (Suez, United Utilities and Bechtel), corporate governance practices differed considerably between the two from the outset. For example, Maynilad generally awarded management and technical consultancies to subsidiaries of its French (Suez) and Filipino (Benpres) partners. Such related-party transactions were partly responsible for internal confl icts reported between the two partners, but also led to higher costs for start-up and enhancement operations. Manila Water's trajectory, involving few dealings with related parties, avoided such problems. Secondly, the concessionaires' different fi nancial management practices were critical determinants of their success in the years following privatisation. In adjusting to the Asian financial crisis, Manila Water went for smaller loans at the beginning targeting operating effi ciency and service improvement, and then gradually scaled up borrowing to produce a virtuous fi nancing cycle of investment and effi ciency improvement. Although this strategy deviated from Manila Water's contractual commitment to capital expenditure, it shielded the company through the turbulent years immediately following the crisis. Maynilad, by contrast, did not make similar adjustments and large capital investment without resulting operational effi ciencies led to more accumulated fi nancial losses that eventually bankrupted the company.
Thirdly, the concessionaires' relative success with water privatisation was linked to their attention to two critical factors that have seldom been managed well: the transformation of a public utility into a private company; and, management of public expectations about the services the utility is pledged to deliver. One key to Manila Water's overall success was that it catered its operations management towards these two considerations from the very beginning. Employees transferring from MWSS were perceived as having valuable prior experience and were given training to adapt to the new privatised organisational culture and to its innovations, some of which, such as territory management, were designed to improve employee performance. Manila Water has also been sensitive to objections to water privatisation and has made concerted efforts to dispel such opposition through initiatives such as its Water for the Community programme. In comparison, Maynilad's approaches have been less well conceived. For example, management and employees imported from outside the pre-existing public company often had no experience of water supply utilities and lines installed in poor neighbourhoods were not designed to prevent unauthorised taps.
The results of our exploration of the effects of internal factors in water privatisation have several important policy implications. Analyses that ignore the importance of such internal factors may lead either to oversubscription to the general notion of privatisation or, conversely, to underestimation of its potential for water supply solutions. Privatisation will not automatically bring effi ciency gains unless privatised companies can allocate substantial resources towards reorienting internal organisation and operations; but to reject privatisation outright, on the basis of 'inherent' incompatibility between the private sector and water business, may deprive the public of a valuable option.
Our emphasis on internal factors is not intended to imply that public policy cannot play an active role in shaping the outcome of privatisation. On the contrary, there are ample opportunities for governments and the regulatory agencies to infl uence private corporate decisions on internal factors through the bidding process, through regulatory actions and through asset ownership (in the case of concessions).
We also point out that the importance of internal factors to the quality of performance by water concessionaires in Metro Manila, the subject of our study here, offers some encouragement to municipalities struggling with failing public utilities and an unfavourable external environment for water privatisation. By learning from the best practices of privatised water utilities, public utilities can envision and achieve improvements in water services through internal restructuring within the public context. The current slowdown in privatisation does not mean that public water utilities should remain unchanged. Manila Water's successful tactics show that innovation in internal management, especially attention to performance incentives and rewards for experienced personnel, can help to close the gaps in water services to the urban poor.
Notes
1. Pyramiding is defi ned as owning a majority of a stock of one corporation that in turn holds a majority of the stock of another, a process that can be repeated a number of times; cross-holding is defi ned as a company further down the chain of control having some shares in another company in the same business group (Claessens et al., 2002) . 2. Non-revenue water (NRW) refers to water that is not billed because of leakage through holes in the pipes, illegal connections or measurement problems due to faulty meters. 3. The concession fees were split 90:10 between Maynilad and Manila Water, refl ecting the utilisation ratio of capital from MWSS' borrowings prior to the privatisation. It was expected that Manila Water (East Zone) would incur higher capital expenditure because it included new development areas where connections were yet to be installed. Few connections were envisioned for the West Zone (Fabella, 2006 
